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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of social activism on financial system stability. Financial stability was 
analysed from two complementary perspectives: bank-led financial stability and financial system 
stability driven by sector-wide credit supply. Social activism was analysed from three perspectives: 
gender equality advocacy, environmental sustainability advocacy, and social protection advocacy. The 
findings reveal that gender equality and environmental sustainability advocacy have significant positive 
effects for financial stability while social protection advocacy has a significant negative effect for 
financial stability. Also, social activism has negative effects for financial stability in the post-2008 
financial crisis era. Finally, there are differential effects for country-groups, for instance, social activism 
strongly improves bank-led financial stability in African countries and for BLEND countries (countries 
that are eligible for IDA borrowing based on per capita income levels and are also creditworthy for 
some borrowing from the International Bank of Restructuring and Development (IBRD). The findings 
are relevant for the on-going debate about whether social inclusivity and activism has any economic 
value for the stability of businesses and the financial system. The findings have implications. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the impact of social activism on financial stability. Social activism in finance is 
an issue that financial stability policymakers are concerned about, to a lesser degree – although it should 
be taken more seriously. One serious implication of social activism for financial stability is that social 
activism, when disruptive, can worsen or prolong an existing financial crisis in unpredictable ways.  
Although a pro-active financial regulator or policymaker can carry out some early assessment to 
determine the optimal level of social activism which promotes stability in the financial system, the pro-
active policymaker may face some difficulty in identifying the specific social activism indicators to 
focus on, the type of social activism, and the intensity of activism that pose the greatest risk to financial 
system stability, and whether to analyse the activism indicators as a group or in isolation.1  
Moreover, the general lack of attention given to social activism as a potential significant risk in the 
global financial stability policy setting shows that policymakers underestimate the potential for human 
behaviour to disrupt financial systems. Furthermore, in the literature, there is a lack of understanding 
of how social movements can affect financial stability in good and bad times. Although past research 
shows, for example, that organised social activism may shape firms’ decisions to adopt ‘genuine’ 
strategies to improve social factors such as environmental sustainability and gender equality practices 
(Lenox and Eesley 2009) or adopt ‘ceremonial façades’ pretending to achieve these objectives (Forbes 
and Jermier 2002), yet we know little about the effect of social activism for the stability of the financial 
system. Motivated by these concerns, our study is the first attempt to investigate the impact of social 
activism on financial stability, to determine whether greater social activism promotes stability or 
instability in the financial system. 
From a policy standpoint, the events following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis which led to violent 
protests in several countries including the abduction of staff of some finance corporations in Asia and 
the destruction of corporate assets of some financial institutions in some European countries, have led 
policy makers around the world to consider investing some resources into social mechanisms that 
promote short-term stability both in their policy narratives and in their supervision and regulatory 
interventions during bad times in order to calm tensions among individuals and other groups affected 
by existing financial imbalances in the financial system. To achieve these goals, policy makers need a 
clear understanding of the most critical social activism indicators to focus on.  
The analyses in this paper sheds some light on this issue by analysing social activism from three 
indicators or perspectives: gender equality advocacy, environmental sustainability advocacy and social 
protection advocacy, to identify the indicators which pose the greatest contribution to financial stability 
or instability. A good starting point to answer this question is to investigate whether organised (or 
institutional) social activism promotes (or reduces) financial stability. Organised (or institutional) social 
activism refers to the institutions established to promote gender equality, environmental sustainability 
and social protection in a country. We focus on whether higher (organised) social activism is associated 
with higher or lower financial stability - this is our contribution to the debate on the effect on social 
inclusivity on financial stability.  
In this study, financial stability was analysed from two complementary perspectives: bank-led financial 
stability and financial system stability driven by sector-wide credit supply to the private sector, while 
social activism was analysed from three perspectives: gender equality advocacy, environmental 
sustainability advocacy, and social protection advocacy. The findings reveal that social activism has 
                                                          
1 bearing in mind that the potential for such analyses is subject to the availability of data on social activism. 
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positive effects for bank-led financial stability, and negative effects for sector-wide financial system 
stability, and there are differential effects for country-groups. 
Our contribution to the financial stability literature is three-fold. First, our study contributes to existing 
studies that explore the causes of instability in financial systems (such as Allen and Gale, 2004; 
Fernández et al, 2016; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 
2009, Ozili and Thankom, 2018, etc). These studies identify the risk factors or determinants of 
instability in financial systems. The current study adds to this literature by showing that social activism 
is also a potential risk factor which can influence financial stability. To date, studies that investigate 
whether financial stability is influenced by social activism with a focus on gender equality, 
environmental sustainability and social protection, are non-existent in the literature. Secondly, from a 
policy standpoint, insights gained from this study can help financial system regulators to understand the 
importance of assessing not only credit risk and capital adequacy in financial systems, but also the 
impact of institutionalised social activism and its activities on the stability of financial systems. Policy 
makers are currently analysing crisis scenarios to identify possible risk factors that could initiate a new 
crisis or prolong an existing crisis in financial systems across countries. Our study is the first attempt in 
this direction, focusing on three dimensions of social activism.2 Finally, our study contributes to the 
Law and Finance literature which examine the impact of the quality of legal institutions on the 
performance of financial institutions and the economy. Our findings suggest that advocacy groups with 
legal backing (through institutionalisation), can have both negative or positive effects for financial 
stability.   
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework for 
social activism. Section 3 reviews the recent literature on financial stability and social activism. Section 
4 presents the data and methodology. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Theory 
2.1. Conceptual Framework 
Social activism is an intentional action with the goal of bringing about social change. Social activism 
is at the centre of modern democracy. Several studies of social movements argue that activists 
strategically target firms, universities, young people, other organizations, and local and state authorities 
to enforce social change on a range of issues ranging from human rights to social protection to energy 
and to the environment (see, Rao 2009; Schurman and Munro 2009; Sine and Lee 2009; Soule 2009; 
Zald, Morill, and Rao 2005, Vasi and King 2012). These studies conclude that organizational change is 
often a direct consequence of social movement activism, caused by the potential threat activists make 
to their targets through protest and other extra-institutional tactics (King 2008a; King and Soule 2007). 
Social activists fight for a cause they believe would benefit society even though their activism often 
benefits one group in society at the expense of another group.  
Recently, there are three mainstream causes of social activism: gender equality, environmental 
sustainability and social protection. It is not uncommon to see individuals and organised groups 
protesting3 against corporations in these three areas, and such activism if successful can affect the 
                                                          
2 We focus on these three dimensions of social activism due to data availability. However, we aware that these 
three dimensions of social activism are not the only dimension of social activism. 
3 In the financial services industry, social activists may protest CEO excessive bonuses, excessive fees charged 
by fat-cat analysts, under-presentation of women in C-suite positions, gender pay gap, customer data sharing, 
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stability and short-term profitability of corporations, requiring corporations to develop new strategies 
to deal with the impact of social activism on their business operations or business interests. 
Consequently, corporations are changing their policies and committing substantial financial resources 
to become more socially inclusive in the areas of gender equality, environmental sustainability and 
social protection, even though there is little or no evidence to suggest that such social considerations 
improves the stability or performance of corporations. 
Social activism can be moderate or disruptive. Disruptive social activism can have devastating effects 
for the stability of the financial system of any country particularly when members of the public 
deliberately by-pass existing ‘rules of engagement’ guiding the social movement, preferring to act on 
their own during a crisis. During a crisis, members of the public can take laws into their hands by 
engaging in violent protests, riots, and can deliberately inflict physical harm on corporate executives 
who they feel are to blame for on-going events, and such activism could worsen the present crisis and 
erode confidence in the entire financial system until the financial system is brought to a stand-still. 
During periods of disruptive social activism, financial institutions are often the scapegoat because they 
are custodians of the financial resources in a country. While disruptive activism is undesirable due to 
its social, economic and political consequences; its likelihood of occurring is not zero if the public do 
not trust regulators and corporations; therefore, financial system regulators must anticipate the worst 
before a crisis occur and should consider social activism as a risk factor in their stress test modelling. 
In the absence of disruptive social activism, policymakers also have concerns that excessive focus on 
social inclusivity within the financial services industry can increase systemic risks in the financial 
system because excessive social inclusivity can distract financial institutions from their core business 
by pressuring them to adjust their risk models to include social factors which are often very fluid and 
cannot be reasonable measured, thus amplifying systemic risks in the financial system - and it is also 
difficult to allocate risk-capital for ‘social risk’ if there is evidence that they amplify systemic risk. 
Therefore, finding the optimal level of social inclusivity that improves the stability of financial 
institutions and the stability of the financial system is the big question that has not been answered in the 
literature, and it is doubtful that a single study can exhaustively address this question. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1. Financial Stability 
There is no consensus on the definition of financial stability among central banks and academics 
(Oosterloo and De Haan, 2003; Houben et al, 2004; Ozili, 2018); notwithstanding, there are some 
definitions for financial stability in the theoretical literature. Financial stability can be defined as “a 
condition in which the financial system – comprising of financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructure – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances, thereby 
mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are severe enough 
to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment opportunities” (ECB (2007)). 
Others consider financial stability to be the absence of financial crises. From a macro-prudential 
viewpoint, Borio (2003) defines financial stability in terms of limiting risks of significant real output 
losses associated with episodes of financial system-wide distress. From a financial network viewpoint, 
financial stability is achieved by ensuring the stability of financial institutions that are connected to each 
other by complex web of contractual claims and obligations (Brunnermeier 2009; Gai et al, 2011). At a 
                                                          
environmental pollution, and may protest the high interest rates charged to risky borrowers who are members of 
a sensitive (and poor) ethnic minority group, etc. 
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systemic level, financial stability may be achieved by promoting stability among the systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) in a financial system (Ozili and Thankom, 2018).  
 
Financial stability can be understood through the lens of network theory in finance. Networks are simply 
interconnected nodes where nodes stand for entities such as firms, while the edges or connective links 
in the network represent contractual flows of claims and obligations among firms in the network 
(Markose et al., 2012). In financial networks, nodes stand for financial institutions such as banks and 
other financial intermediaries while the edges or connective links represent contractual flows of 
liquidity and/or obligations to make payments and receive payments (see, Markose et al., 2012, Ozili, 
2017). Over time, financial networks grow and become complex due to increasing volume of financial 
claims and obligations among firms (Haldane, 2009), and such complexity is represented by the 
interconnected web of contractual claims and obligations among firm. Therefore, financial stability in 
a network-style financial system is achieved through the stability of financial institutions that have the 
largest share of financial claims and obligations in the system (Gai et al, 2011). Instability in the 
financial system may arise from social activism, among other factors, as we demonstrate in the next 
section below. 
  
2.2.2. Social Activism  
Social activism theory is based on social constructionist theory which argues that individuals within a 
group, or groups within society, jointly construct their own understanding of the world which form the 
basis for shared assumptions about reality. This means that people construct their own understanding 
and knowledge of the world, through experiencing things and reflecting on those experiences. Because 
activists are at the core of most collective action, sometimes they act alone or seek to draw others into 
collective action (Oliver and Marwell, 1992).  
Activists or members of a social movement do not have a well-defined role or set of activities to which 
all who are affiliated with a movement must conform to, this is because participation in activism is 
rarely homogenous and people can engage in a wide variety of activities on the movement's behalf and 
these activities can range from the mundane to the extraordinary (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991), such 
as people donating money, writing letters to public officials, answer telephones, collect signatures, 
occupy buildings, attend demonstrations, inflict physical harm to corporate executives and assassinate 
political enemies.  
The varied and diverse collection of activities that follows activism led to the distinction between high 
and low-risk/cost activism due to the simple observation that some social activism is more costly and 
more risky than others (McAdam, 1986). The cost of social activism involves the time, money and 
energy required of a person engaged in any form of activism including anything forgone or lost by the 
activists during their participation in activism activities while the risk of social activism refers to the 
activists' subjective anticipation or expectation of a cost that they may incur as a result of their 
participation in a movement, e.g., being arrested, paying a fine, being beaten, tortured, or killed 
(McAdam, 1986; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991). Also, the problems involved in getting other people to 
support collective action also directly affect the kind of goals activists pursue and the tactics they choose 
particularly when social activists try to mobilise collective action from a large group of interested, but 
less committed and less motivated people (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). 
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One effective channel for social activism is social media. There is much evidence in both developed 
and developing countries suggesting that people who engage in civic and political activities including 
protest behaviour are frequent users of social media (Bekkers et al, 2011; Earl and Kimport, 2011; 
Pearce and Kendzior, 2012; Valenzuela, 2012; Yun and Chang, 2011; Valenzuela, 2013). For instance, 
social media users can provide information and news not available in other media to facilitate the 
coordination of demonstrations, allowing users to join political causes, and creating opportunities to 
exchange opinions with other people (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011; Chadwick and Howard, 2008; Gil 
de Zúñiga and Valenzuela, 2011; Yamamoto, 2006). Through social media, consenting individuals or 
groups in democratic societies can agree on a cause to fight for, and coordinate themselves to devise an 
action plan to force their expectations on corporations and governments. Some studies show a positive 
association between the frequency of social media use and protest behaviour (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2012; 
Zhang et al, 2010). Some explanations for the positive association is that social media can facilitate 
access to a large number of contacts, thereby enabling social movements to reach large mass of people 
(Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012). Social media can also promote personal and group identity which are key 
antecedents of political behaviour (Dalton et al, 2009). Social media also allows multiple channels for 
interpersonal feedback, peer acceptance, and the reinforcement of group norms (Papacharissi, 2010). 
Increased participation in online social networks can help to build trusting relationships among 
members that support a political cause, (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2009), further enhancing the potential 
of social media to increase their engagement in protest and other political behaviours (Valenzuela, 
2013). 
In sum, the propensity to join a social movement and to keep individuals committed and motivated 
would depend on the cost and risk associated with such activism and whether they strongly believe in 
the shared reality propagated by the social movement. 
3. Related Literature & Hypothesis 
3.1. Literature 
3.1.1. Financial Stability 
 
A stable financial system is one that enhances economic performance and wealth accumulation, and 
which is also able to prevent adverse disturbances from having a disruptive impact on the financial 
system (Houben et al, 2004). Financial stability is a broad concept which encompasses three different 
dimensions of the financial system - the financial infrastructure, financial institutions and financial 
markets; the interlinkages between these three is important because any (expectations of) disturbances 
in any of the individual components can undermine the overall stability of the financial system (Houben 
et al, 2004). However, financial stability does not require that each part of the financial system is always 
operating near peak performance; in some cases, ensuring that each part of the financial system is 
working at a minimum operating level is rather desirable from time to time (Greenspan, 1999). To 
achieve this, regulators and supervisors need to continuously analyse the state of the financial system, 
to identify risks and vulnerabilities and implement corrective policy response. Risks and vulnerabilities 
in the financial system may develop (i) endogenously within the financial system, (ii) can originate in 
the real economy and be transmitted to the financial system, (iii) and can originate purely from human 
sentiments or social movements. These different sources of risks tend to have different policy 
implications. For instance, the size and likelihood of endogenous imbalances can be influenced by 
financial authorities through regulation and supervision while external disturbances on the financial 
system can be hardly influenced by financial authorities which leaves policymakers with limited options 
for reducing the impact of external disturbances on the financial system. In a nutshell, the analysis of 
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financial stability involves the continuous examination of potential risks and vulnerabilities that may 
threaten the stability of the financial system and economic activity. 
  
3.1.2. Financial Stability Determinants 
In this section, we focus on the recent literature that examine crisis determinants and the implications 
for financial stability. Many studies examine the factors that causes instability in financial systems. For 
instance, some argue that competition can influence financial stability depending on how competition 
and financial stability are measured. For instance, Fu et al (2014) examine the trade-off between 
competition and financial stability for 14 Asia-Pacific economies countries during the 2003 to 2009 
period. They use the Z-score index to measure financial stability and find that better institutional 
development and stringent capital requirements improve financial stability, whereas property rights, 
greater concentration and deposit insurance are associated with greater bank fragility.  
Yeyati and Micco (2007) examine Latin American countries from 1993 to 2002 and find a positive 
relationship between bank risk (as measured by the Z-score) and competition (as captured by the H-
statistic). Schaeck and Cihak (2008) analyse the relationship between bank competition and financial 
soundness using a large sample of banks. They observe that higher competition, measured by the Boone 
indicator, increases bank soundness by increasing efficiency, and they observe that high banking 
concentration has positive effects for financial stability. Ozili (2018) examine the determinants of 
banking stability in Africa for 14 Asia-Pacific economies countries during the 2003 to 2009 period. He 
used the Z-score index to measure banking (or financial) stability and use the Lerner index to measure 
banking competition and find that higher competition improves financial stability in the post-2008 
financial crisis period. The findings also reveal that large banking sectors were more stable than smaller 
banking sectors. 
Others argue that higher capital requirements and funding structure are determinants of financial 
stability. Boyson et al (2014) in their study find that banks that entered the 2008 financial crisis with 
higher capital were less likely to witness a shortage of funding during the crisis. Tracey et al (2017) 
investigate whether the fines imposed on banks for misconduct transmit negative shocks to bank capital, 
how banks respond to it, and its effect on the severity of a financial crisis. They use banks’ misconduct 
fines as a novel instrument to identify exogenous negative shocks that affects bank capital. They find 
that banks respond to such shocks by relaxing their lending standards, measured by the loan-to-value 
and loan-to-income ratios on new mortgages. The implication of banks relaxing their lending standards 
(to adjust for the impact of high misconduct fines on their capital) is that it will increase the vulnerability 
of banks to future shocks, thus increasing the severity of a crisis. Vazquez and Federico (2015) analyse 
the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and the implications 
for financial stability. They analyse US and EU banks during 2001-2009. They find that banks with 
weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward 
while US and EU banks that had stronger capital base and better structural liquidity positions in the pre-
crisis period were less likely to fail and were more financially stable. Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
report a similar result using a data set of US banks. 
Some argue that credit booms can influence financial system stability. Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
and Jordà et al (2013) examine the behaviour of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators and find 
that credit booms (or credit growth) is a powerful predictor of the likelihood of crises and is also the 
most important determinant for economic recovery after crises. From their findings, it is unclear 
whether it is level of credit, or its growth, prior to a crisis that matters most for subsequent stability and 
economic performance. Bridges et al (2017) provided some clarity on this in their study of the role of 
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private sector credit in shaping recessions. They assess whether the growth or level of credit is a more 
useful predictor of the severity of financial crisis or recessions. They find that credit growth has 
historically been a significant predictor of the severity of a crisis whereas the level of leverage was a 
less significant predictor. Borio and Lowe (2002) found that the amount of credit in the economy (i.e., 
credit to GDP) is an important leading indicator for financial crises, especially in combination with an 
investment boom. Also, Schularick & Taylor (2012) find that although credit growth is a good predictor 
of crises, broad money is a less robust predictor, and narrow money is entirely useless as a predictor of 
financial crises. By implication, policy makers should focus less on central bank balance sheets, or even 
broad money, and focus more on broad credit aggregates when evaluating crisis risk. Taylor (2015) 
show that credit and financial stability are intimately linked and can have serious consequences for 
macroeconomic performance; therefore, it makes sense to measure financial stability using some 
aggregate credit indicators.  
Finally, Aikman et al (2018) provides some ideas for rethinking financial stability and the policies for 
achieving it. They show that there are debates about whether the current level of bank capital should be 
higher or lower and whether financial stability policies should be rules-based or discretionary, among 
other issues. They find that a combination of different regulatory metrics can achieve better outcomes 
for financial stability rather than reliance on individual constraints in isolation. However, much studies 
in the literature have not considered social activism as an external shock that can potentially prolong 
existing crises or as a risk factor that could initiate a crisis. In the next section, we test the impact of 
social activism on financial stability. 
3.2. Hypothesis 
To develop our hypotheses, we have two predictions for the impact of social activism on financial 
stability.  
One, we expect that social activism should improve financial stability if instability in the financial 
system is caused, in part, by poor social protection, gender discrimination and environmental pollution 
issues amongst other issues, and that the elimination of these issues through organised social activism 
can positively improve stability in the financial system. Activists can persuade investors to become 
more interested in how social risks (e.g. environmental risk) translates into financial risk (Orol 2010:1), 
hoping that investors would care more about socio-financial stability, not just financial stability only, 
thus promoting stability both for the society and for the financial system. 
H1: Social activism has positive effects for financial stability 
Furthermore, the financial stability of corporations and economic agents might not be affected by social 
activism if economic agents and other participants in the formal financial system do not consider social 
factors or social activism as an important risk factor in their risk modelling for economic and financial 
decision-making. This is because economic agents rely heavily on calculated risks for decision-making 
and are less likely to rely on un-calculated risks such as social activism which can be difficult to reliably 
measure or quantify since social activism as a risk factor is largely dependent on human behaviour 
which is unpredictable. Therefore, provided that social activism considerations are not imposed on 
economic agents, social activism should have no insignificant effect on financial stability 
H2: Social activism has insignificant effects for financial stability 
On the other hand, social activism can have a negative effect for financial stability if stakeholders, 
through activism, engage in activities that pressure corporations and economic agents to consider gender 
equality, social protection and sustainability issues into their business practice due to stakeholders’ 
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concern for the potential for social failure or crisis if such social considerations are ignored. 
Corporations would have to mobilize emergency resources, and allocate extra financial resources as 
expense or provisions, to demonstrate their commitment to addressing these social issues. And such 
coercive pressure by activists on corporations and economic agents can negatively affect the financial 
performance of corporations in the short-run. Companies that refuse to succumb to the coercive pressure 
of activists are often prime targets for reputational damage, and media blackmail, which could make 
companies lose millions of values in revenue, thus, negatively affecting their stability.  
Vasi and King (2012) in their study focused on environment risk issues, to identify the potential effect 
of environmental activism on corporations’ perceived environmental risk and actual financial 
performance. They define environmental risk as stakeholders’ perceptions that a firm’s practices or 
policies will lead to greater potential for an environmental failure or crisis that would expose it to 
financial decline. They examine U.S. firms between 2004 and 2008, and find that stakeholders’ 
environmental sustainability activism against a firm had negative effects on the firm’s financial 
performance; which subsequently affected the firm’s stability.  
H3: Social activism has negative effects for financial stability 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Data 
We use international country data from the World Bank over the 2005 to 2016 period. Country data on 
financial/banking stability were obtained from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 
collected by the World Bank while social activism data was obtained from the Country Policy 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) indicators collected by the World bank. See Appendix A1. For some 
countries, institutional data is not reported for more than three (3) consecutive years and we exclude 
these countries from the sample to control for quality of data reporting. The CPIA database did not 
report meaningful data for most developed countries, thus, these countries were not included our 
country sample. 
The final sample consist of 73 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo DR, Congo Rep, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, 
St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen Republic, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
For the countries included in the sample, some observations were missing for some years, which gives 
an unbalanced final sample. For further robustness checks, in later analyses, we divided the countries 
into four economic groupings (see Appendix A2), where each country group reflect different levels of 
dependence on development lending (per the World Bank), to understand the association between social 
activism and financial stability within these country groups. 
4.2. Methodology 
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We develop the model using country-level institutional and stability data, and regress financial stability 
as a function of social activism variables and financial stability determinants. The baseline model 
specification adopted is a modified model from Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and Fernández, González 
and Suárez (2016) and Ozili (2018). 
Stability = f (social activism (ESR, GEQ, SP), banking sector variables (EFF, REG, FREG) and 
macroeconomic factors (ΔGDP, MAM)) 
The econometric specification of the model is expressed as: 
𝑌(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, 𝑃𝐹)𝑖, 𝑡 
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝑡 
+  𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒 … . . (1) 
𝑌(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, 𝑃𝐹)𝑖, 𝑡 
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐸𝑄𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝑡 
+  𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒 … . . (2) 
𝑌(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, 𝑃𝐹)𝑖, 𝑡 
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝑡 
+  𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒 … … (3) 
Where, 
i = country 
t = year 
Y = a vector of dependent variables, representing measures of financial stability 
RISK = banking sector insolvency risk, a measure of financial stability 
PF = domestic credit to private sector (%) of GDP, a measure of financial stability 
ESR = quality of environmental sustainability advocacy institutions 
GEQ = quality of gender equality advocacy institutions 
SP = quality of social protection advocacy institutions 
REG = strength of regulatory environment  
FREG = financial sector quality 
MAM = macroeconomic management variable 
EFF = banking sector efficiency 
ΔGDP = state of the economy 
e = error term. 
The dependent variables are ‘RISK’ (insolvency risk measured by the z-score) and ‘PF’ (domestic credit 
to private sector to GDP ratio). The Z-score measures the insolvency risk of the banking sector 
calculated at bank level as return on assets (ROA) plus the capital to asset ratio (CAR) divided by the 
standard deviation of asset returns. ZSCORE = (ROA+ CAR)/SDROA, where ROA is the rate of return 
on assets, CAR is the capital to asset ratio, and SDROA is an estimate of the standard deviation of the 
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rate of return on assets. Higher Z-score values indicate that the banking sector is more stable because it 
is inversely related to the probability of bank insolvency; in other words, a high z-score implies lower 
insolvency risk or improved banking stability (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013). Moreover, we are aware of 
concerns that the Z-score is skewed, accordingly, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is 
normally distributed. Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston et al (2010), Beck et al (2013) and Fernández, 
González and Suárez (2016) and Ozili (2018), among others, have recently used the natural logarithm 
of Z-score as a proxy for bank insolvency risk when measuring financial stability.  
The second dependent variable is ‘PF’ (ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP). The PF ratio 
is a broad measure of financial stability, that reflect sector-wide financial system stability. PF ratio is 
broader than the z-score metric because it reflects the supply of domestic credit to the private sector 
which play a significant role in the development and stability of an economy. We use this ratio as a 
stability indicator because of strong evidence in the literature that abnormal credit supply is a significant 
predictor of financial instability (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al, 2013; Bridges et al, 2017). 
A high PF ratio indicates that higher financial resources or financing is available to the private sector 
in a country, which subsequently provides greater opportunity for the private sector to develop and grow 
and give back to lending institutions, thus maintaining a healthy credit supply-induced financial system 
stability. A low PF ratio indicates that the private sector has insufficient supply of financial resources 
and can lead to the failure of many firms in the private sector and could lead to massive losses for 
financial institutions linked to the failing private firms, thus, the supply of credit to the private sector is 
crucial for sector-wide financial system stability. In the analyses, we use the natural logarithm of PF to 
correct for skewness in the PF distribution.  
The main explanatory variables are the social activism indicators: gender equality (GEQ) variable, 
environmental sustainability (ESR) variable and social protection (SP) variable. As discussed in the 
hypothesis section, we do not have definite prediction for the impact of social activism on the stability 
variables. For the control variables, EFF variable is the cost to income ratio and reflects the efficiency 
of the banking sector in a country. A low cost-to-income ratio should correlate with higher bank-led 
financial stability because efficient banks are better at reducing cost which improves their profitability 
and improves their stability in the short-term (Olson and Zoubi, 2011; Athanasoglou et al, 2008); 
therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the EFF and the stability variables. Economic 
growth (ΔGDP) is a macroeconomic variable that reflect the state of the economy. (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005, Ozili and Outa, 2017). The rate of loan defaults is generally lower during periods 
of economic growth, which consequently has positive effects for banking sector stability, and 
conversely, the rate of loan defaults is generally higher during a recession, which consequently has 
negative effects for banking sector stability (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Ozili and Outa, 2017); 
therefore, a positive relationship between financial stability and the state of the economy is expected. 
REG and FREG variables capture regulatory quality and financial sector quality respectively. A strong 
regulatory environment and high financial sector quality should lead to greater financial stability 
because they reflect the sound policies put in place to protect depositors, customers, business clients, as 
well as safeguards to discourage financial misconduct in the financial system. MAM variable captures 
the quality of macroeconomic management in a country. Strong macroeconomic management by 
regulators is vital for financial stability in a country because it can provide regulators with the optimal 
mix of fiscal, monetary and ad-hoc policy tools which they can utilize to regulate the financial system 
to promote stability. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between macroeconomic management 
quality and financial stability. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics & Correlation 
Table 1 provides the summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables from 2005 to 2016 period. 
The means of most variables are around their respective medians particularly for ESR (3.14%), REG 
(3.25%), FREG (3.05%), MAM (3.66%) and ΔGDP (4.76%). The correlation matrix for the variables 
is reported in Table 2. RISK and ESR have a low positive correlation which is not statistically 
significant. PF and ESR have a low positive correlation which is statistically significant and suggests 
that a one unit increase in environmental sustainability advocacy is associated with a 0.35 increase in 
sector-wide financial system stability. RISK and PF are significantly correlated with SP, indicating 
that increase in social protection advocacy is correlated with increase in financial stability. RISK and 
GEQ have a very low positive correlation which is not statistically significant while PF and GEQ are 
positively correlated and significant. RISK and FREG have a very low positive correlation which is 
not statistically significant. PF and FREG are positively correlated and significant and suggests that a 
strong financial sector is strongly correlated with greater sector-wide financial system stability. RISK 
and MAM are positively correlated but not significant. PF and MAM are positively correlated and 
statistically significant and suggests that strong macroeconomic management is strongly correlated 
with financial stability. RISK and PF are significant and negatively correlated with EFF and suggests 
that higher banking sector efficiency is correlated with greater sector-wide financial system stability. 
RISK and ΔGDP have a very low negative correlation which is not statistically significant while PF 
and ΔGDP are negatively correlated and statistically significant and suggests that economic growth is 
negatively correlated with sector-wide financial system stability. Overall, all correlation coefficients 
are sufficiently low to be concerned about multicollinearity in the study. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 RISK PF ESR SP GEQ FREG MAM EFF ΔGDP 
 Mean  11.01  27.43  3.14  3.08  3.39  3.05  3.66  63.37  4.76 
 Median  9.74  21.30  3.00  3.00  3.50  3.00  3.50  61.75  4.83 
 Maximum  53.63  114.72  4.50  4.50  5.00  4.50  5.50  166.25  26.11 
 Minimum -1.38  1.20  1.50  1.00  1.50  1.00  1.00  20.00 -36.69 
 Std. Dev.  6.64  20.79  0.55  0.54  0.65  0.57  0.66  21.12  4.47 
Observations  735  760  849  845  849  849  849  723  870 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
            
            
Correlations  RISK ESR GEQ SP GD EFF FREG REG ΔGDP MAM PF 
RISK  1.000           
 -----           
            
ESR  0.025 1.000          
 (0.516) -----          
            
GEQ  0.057 0.476*** 1.000         
 (0.136) (0.000) -----         
            
SP  0.083** 0.445*** 0.531*** 1.000        
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) -----        
            
GD  0.068* 0.774*** 0.857*** 0.793*** 1.000       
 (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----       
            
EFF  -0.282*** -0.066* -0.137*** -0.179*** -0.157*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----      
            
FREG  0.019 0.382*** 0.367*** 0.510*** 0.511*** -0.067* 1.000     
 (0.617) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) -----     
            
REG  0.021 0.501*** 0.497*** 0.663*** 0.675*** -0.058 0.584 1.000    
 (0.586) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.000) -----    
            
ΔGDP  -0.011 0.053 0.022 0.090** 0.064* -0.112*** -0.039 0.012 1.000   
 (0.768) (0.170) 0.568 (0.020) (0.098) (0.004) (0.304) (0.762) -----   
            
MAM  0.012 0.268*** 0.282*** 0.307*** 0.351*** -0.033 0.340*** 0.365*** 0.155*** 1.000  
 (0.754) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.395) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----  
            
PF  0.109*** 0.352*** 0.412*** 0.278*** 0.435*** -0.076** 0.337*** 0.403**** -0.164*** 0.088** 1.000 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) ----- 
            
Pearson correlation matrix for the 2005 to 2016 period. P-values reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
            
 
 5.2. Regression Results 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the regression results where the dependent variable is the z-score index 
representing bank-led financial stability. In column 1 of Table 3, ESR coefficient is negative and 
insignificant, indicating that environmental sustainability advocacy is not significantly associated with 
financial stability. This finding supports Vasi and King (2012) who find that environmental activism 
has negative effects for firm performance. In column 2, SP coefficient is negative and insignificant, 
indicating that social protection advocacy is not significantly associated with financial sector stability. 
In column 3, GEQ coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that gender equality advocacy is 
significantly associated with financial sector stability; implying that greater gender equality advocacy 
improves bank-led financial stability. This result also supports the first hypothesis which predicts a 
positive association between social activism (gender equality advocacy) and financial stability. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression results where the dependent variable is domestic credit to 
private sector to GDP (PF) ratio, which is a broad measure of stability that captures sector-wide 
financial system stability. In column 5 of Table 3, ESR coefficient is positively significant, indicating 
that environmental sustainability advocacy is positively associated with sector-wide financial system 
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stability. This result supports the first hypothesis which predicts a positive association between social 
activism and financial stability. This implication is that greater advocacy for environmental 
sustainability can lead to improved sector-wide financial system stability. This finding does not 
support Vasi and King (2012) who find that environmental activism has negative effects for firm 
performance. In column 6, SP coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that social protection 
advocacy has negative effects for sector-wide financial system stability. In column 7, GEQ coefficient 
is negative but not significant, indicating that gender equality advocacy does not have a significant 
impact on financial system stability. 
For the control variables, REG coefficient is negative but insignificant in Panel A while REG 
coefficient is positive in Panel B and significant in column 6&7 indicating that countries with strong 
business regulations have stable financial systems. FREG coefficient is positive but insignificant in 
Panel A, while FREG coefficient is positive and significant in column 5, 6, 7 & 8 of Panel B, 
indicating that countries with high financial sector quality have a more stable financial system. MAM 
coefficient is insignificant in Panel A & B. EFF coefficient is negatively significant in Panel A, which 
implies that countries with higher banking efficiency experience greater financial stability; however, 
the effect is not significant when we use the broad measure of financial stability (PF) in Panel B. 
ΔGDP coefficient is negative and insignificant in Panel A, while ΔGDP coefficient is negative and 
significant in column 5 of Panel B indicating that countries that have high economic growth 
experience lower sector-wide financial system stability. 
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Table 3: Regression Results: Effect of Social Activism on Financial Stability 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure: Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 2.707*** 
(14.93) 
2.753*** 
(14.629) 
2.419*** 
(12.29) 
2.723*** 
(12.68) 
1.836*** 
(8.95) 
2.387*** 
(11.01) 
2.138*** 
(9.03) 
1.989*** 
(7.84) 
ESR -0.05 
(-1.56) 
   0.127*** 
(3.52) 
   
SP  -0.059 
(-1.56) 
   -0.103** 
(-2.42) 
  
GEQ   0.062* 
(1.67) 
   -0.007 
(-0.18) 
 
GD    -0.043 
(-0.78) 
   0.055 
(0.86) 
REG -0.017 
(-0.44) 
-0.017 
(-0.45) 
-0.031 
(-0.81) 
-0.022 
(-0.56) 
0.046 
(1.11) 
0.083** 
(1.99) 
0.070* 
(1.69) 
0.055 
(1.30) 
FREG 0.027 
(0.71) 
0.031 
(0.84) 
0.019 
(0.53) 
0.029 
(0.79) 
0.209*** 
(5.03) 
0.218*** 
(5.23) 
0.212*** 
(5.04) 
0.213*** 
(5.09) 
MAM -0.016 
(-0.63) 
-0.023 
(-0.89) 
-0.020 
(-0.81) 
-0.022 
(-0.88) 
-0.005 
(-0.18) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
EFF -0.004*** 
(-6.55) 
-0.004*** 
(-6.68) 
-0.004*** 
(-6.61) 
-0.004*** 
(-6.65) 
0.0002 
(0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
0.0003 
(0.42) 
0.0003 
(0.36) 
ΔGDP -0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
-0.005* 
(-1.92) 
-0.003 
(-1.34) 
-0.004 
(-1.42) 
-0.004 
(-1.49) 
Country and 
Year fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 87.11 87.09 87.11 87.05 92.18 92.24 92.02 92.17 
F-statistic 55.36 54.95 55.39 54.76 109.62 91.61 102.58 90.75 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 701 697 701 697 668 664 668 664 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Explanatory variables: ESR = environmental sustainability advocacy variable; SP = social protection advocacy variable; GEQ 
= gender equality advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM = macroeconomic management quality variable; EFF 
= banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: RISK = natural logarithm of z-score, reflecting banking 
insolvency risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) stability; PF = natural logarithm of domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) representing sector-wide financial system stability which is achieved through sufficient credit supply to the private sector 
within the financial system, higher is better. GD = aggregate cluster for the social activism aggregate variables. 
 
 
5.3. Additional Tests 
5.3.1 Social activism cluster index 
Here, we address concerns for the need to adopt some composite index for social activism. To do this, 
we introduce a social activism aggregate cluster variable or index (GD) into the model as the main 
explanatory variable representing social activism. The GD cluster variable is calculated as the average 
of the sum of the ESR, GEQ and SP values. We re-run the estimation and the results are reported in 
column 4 & 8 of Table 3. GD coefficient is positive and insignificant in column 8 of Table 3, 
whereas, GD coefficient is negative and insignificant in column 4 of Table 3 when we use both a 
narrow and broad measure of financial stability, indicating that social activism is not significantly 
associated with bank-led financial stability or sector-wide financial system stability. Therefore, we 
draw our inference from the separate estimations for each social activism indicator, rather than the 
cluster indicator. 
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5.3.2. Pre- and Post- Financial Crisis 
Next, we test whether the relationship between social activism and financial stability is significant in 
the post-2008 financial crisis period. The current advocacy for gender equality, environmental 
sustainability and social protection became more pronounced during the years after the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis, therefore it is important to identify whether the influence of social activism on 
financial stability was stronger since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The result is reported in 
Table 4. 
In Panel A of Table 4, FN*ESR, FN*SP, FN*GEQ and FN*GD coefficients are negative and 
insignificant in column 4 and indicate that social activism had no significant impact on bank-led 
financial stability in the post-crisis period. This implies that greater advocacy for environmental 
sustainability, gender equality, and social protection did not improve financial (and banking) stability 
in the post-crisis period examined. However, in Panel B of Table 4, only FN*ESR and FN*SP 
coefficients are negative and significant, indicating that the advocacy for environmental sustainability 
and social protection has negative effects for sector-wide financial system stability in the post-crisis 
period. 
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Table 4. Influence of Financial Crisis on the association between Social Activism and Financial Stability 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure: Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 2.586*** 
(13.61) 
2.634*** 
(13.54) 
2.324*** 
(11.44) 
2.586*** 
(11.64) 
1.497*** 
(6.59) 
1.968*** 
(8.33) 
2.038*** 
(7.89) 
1.669*** 
(6.04) 
FN*ESR -0.017 
(-0.52) 
   -0.075* 
(-1.94) 
   
FN*SP  -0.015 
(-0.44) 
   -0.146*** 
(-3.47) 
  
FN*GEQ   -0.006 
(-0.24) 
   0.041 
(1.35) 
 
FN*GD    -0.019 
(-0.51) 
   -0.049 
(-1.11) 
ESR -0.035 
(-0.92) 
   0.196*** 
(4.32) 
   
SP  -0.044 
(-0.97) 
   0.006 
(0.11) 
  
GEQ   0.067* 
(1.71) 
   -0.033* 
(-0.69) 
 
GD    -0.024 
(-0.39) 
   0.102 
(1.43) 
FN 0.083 
(0.78) 
0.076 
(0.68) 
0.046 
(0.51) 
0.090 
(0.73) 
0.542*** 
(4.38) 
0.779*** 
(5.83) 
0.174 
(1.61) 
0.478*** 
(3.26) 
REG -0.018 
(-0.46) 
-0.017 
(-0.44) 
-0.029 
(-0.78) 
-0.021 
(-0.54) 
0.044 
(0.98) 
0.099** 
(2.21) 
0.062 
(1.38) 
0.060 
(1.31) 
FREG 0.029 
(0.79) 
0.032 
(0.86) 
0.023 
(0.61) 
0.032 
(0.84) 
0.202*** 
(4.54) 
0.188*** 
(4.19) 
0.207*** 
(4.59) 
0.203*** 
(4.51) 
MAM -0.018 
(-0.73) 
-0.024 
(-0.95) 
-0.021 
(-0.85) 
-0.024 
(-0.95) 
-0.039 
(-1.27) 
-0.046 
(-1.49) 
-0.016 
(-0.51) 
-0.031 
(-0.99) 
EFF -0.003*** 
(-6.13) 
-0.003*** 
(-6.43) 
-0.004*** 
(-6.35) 
-0.004*** 
(-6.34) 
0.002*** 
(2.60) 
0.002*** 
(2.48) 
0.002*** 
(2.83) 
0.002*** 
(2.83) 
ΔGDP -0.001 
(-0.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
-0.001 
(-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-1.42) 
-0.003 
(-0.94) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.96) 
Country 
fixed effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 86.96 86.94 86.98 86.90 90.94 91.10 90.68 90.81 
F-statistic 60.89 60.38 60.97 60.20 86.83 87.10 84.21 85.01 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 701 697 701 697 668 664 668 664 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Explanatory variables: ESR = environmental sustainability advocacy variable; SP = social protection advocacy variable; GEQ 
= gender equality advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM = macroeconomic management quality variable; EFF 
= banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: RISK = natural logarithm of z-score, reflecting banking 
insolvency risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) stability; PF = domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
representing sector-wide financial system stability which is achieved through sufficient credit supply to the private sector within the 
financial system, higher is better. GD = aggregate cluster for the social activism aggregate variables. FN = binary variable that equals one 
for the post-financial crisis period (2009-2016), and zero otherwise. 
 
5.3.3. Country-Group Analyses, per World Bank 
Next, we test whether the association between social activism and financial stability is influenced by 
country groups, per the World Bank. We adopt the World Bank’s country grouping4 and divide the 
sample into four-country groups5: African countries, low-income countries, IDA countries and 
                                                          
4 https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups 
5 The four country groups reflect countries that are required by the World Bank and other supranational bodies 
to promote societal and gender equality, as conditions to be eligible to receive continuous lending from 
international aid organisations.  
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BLEND countries.6 We constructed four binary variables to represent each of the four-country groups: 
AFR, LOW, IDA and BLEND variables. The AFR variable equals one if the country is an African 
country and zero otherwise. LOW variable equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero 
otherwise. IDA variable equals one if the country is an IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND 
variable equals one if the country is a BLEND country and zero otherwise. Finally, each social 
activism variable is interacted with each of the four-country group variable, and thereafter regressed 
against the two financial stability variables. The results are reported below in Table 5, 6 & 7, and the 
variables of interest are the interaction variables. A summary of the results is presented in Table 9. 
5.3.3.1. Environmental sustainability advocacy 
In Panel A of Table 5, AFR*ESR, LOW*ESR and BLEND*ESR coefficients are positively 
significant in column 4 and indicate that the association between environmental sustainability 
advocacy and financial stability is positive and significant for African countries, low-income countries 
and for BLEND countries. This implies that greater advocacy for environmental sustainability can 
improve bank-led financial stability for African countries, low-income countries and for BLEND 
countries. On the other hand, IDA*ESR coefficient is negatively significant, and implies that 
environmental sustainability advocacy has negative effects for bank-led financial stability in IDA 
countries. In Panel B of Table 5, AFR*ESR and IDA*ESR coefficients are negatively significant, 
indicating that environmental sustainability has negative effects for sector-wide financial system 
stability particularly for African countries and IDA countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 See Appendix 1 for description of country groups. 
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Table 5. Effect of Environmental Sustainability Advocacy on Financial Stability (country group analyses) 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure: Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 3.389*** 
(13.07) 
3.058*** 
(13.51) 
2.076*** 
(7.45) 
2.999*** 
(14.59) 
0.635** 
(2.37) 
1.095*** 
(4.33) 
0.988*** 
(3.04) 
1.027*** 
(4.25) 
ESR -0.131** 
(-2.13) 
-0.053 
(-1.02) 
0.145* 
(1.87) 
-0.123** 
(-2.37) 
0.458*** 
(7.32) 
0.321*** 
(5.53) 
0.495*** 
(5.58) 
0.253*** 
(4.20) 
AFR*ESR 0.166** 
(2.05) 
   -0.423*** 
(-5.10) 
   
LOW*ESR  0.152* 
(1.77) 
   -0.098 
(-1.03) 
  
IDA*ESR   -0.252*** 
(-2.80) 
   -0.288*** 
(-2.83) 
 
BLEND*ESR    0.430*** 
(4.40) 
   0.052 
(0.44) 
AFR -0.902*** 
(-3.41) 
   0.639** 
(2.38) 
   
LOW  -0.749*** 
(-2.71) 
   -0.228 
(-0.74) 
  
IDA   0.832*** 
(2.83) 
   0.470 
(1.41) 
 
BLEND    -1.339*** 
(-4.21) 
   0.155 
(0.39) 
REG -0.067 
(-1.48) 
-0.047 
(-1.01) 
0.021 
(0.45) 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
0.163*** 
(3.49) 
0.186*** 
(3.60) 
0.249*** 
(4.80) 
0.250*** 
(4.58) 
FREG 0.006 
(0.13) 
-0.015 
(-0.31) 
0.008 
(0.16) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
0.382*** 
(7.54) 
0.342*** 
(6.11) 
0.256*** 
(4.31) 
0.368*** 
(6.17) 
MAM 0.049 
(1.33) 
0.058 
(1.52) 
0.063 
(1.63) 
0.081** 
(2.13) 
-0.074* 
(-1.92) 
-0.056 
(-1.32) 
-0.083* 
(-1.91) 
-0.084* 
(-1.85) 
EFF -0.007*** 
(-6.88) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.18) 
-0.009*** 
(-8.52) 
-0.010*** 
(-8.95) 
-0.002 
(-1.35) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.13) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.83) 
ΔGDP -0.006 
(-1.34) 
-0.011** 
(-2.28) 
-0.008* 
(-1.65) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.74) 
Year fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 16.75 12.27 8.38 9.94 53.74 43.81 40.74 35.92 
F-statistic 8.41 6.15 4.37 5.06 41.77 28.37 25.13 20.67 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 701 701 701 701 668 668 668 668 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Explanatory variables: ESR = environmental sustainability advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM 
= macroeconomic management quality variable; EFF = banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: 
RISK = natural logarithm of z-score, reflecting banking insolvency risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) 
stability; PF = domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) representing sector-wide financial system stability which is achieved through 
sufficient credit supply to the private sector within the financial system, higher is better. AFR = binary variable that equals one if the 
country is an African country and zero otherwise. LOW = binary variable that equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero 
otherwise. IDA = binary variable that equals one if the country is an IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND = binary variable that equals 
one if the country is a BLEND country and zero otherwise.  
5.3.3.2. Gender Equality Advocacy 
In Panel A of Table 6, AFR*GEQ, LOW*GEQ and BLEND*GEQ coefficients are positive and 
significant in column 1, 2 & 4 indicating that the association between gender equality advocacy and 
financial stability is positively significant for African countries, low-income countries and for 
BLEND countries. This implies that greater advocacy for gender equality can improve bank-led 
financial stability for African countries, low-income countries and for BLEND countries. However, in 
Panel B of Table 6, only AFR*GEQ coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that greater 
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gender equality advocacy has negative effects for sector-wide financial system stability among 
African countries. 
Table 6. Effect of Gender Equality Advocacy on Financial Stability (country group analyses) 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 3.237*** 
(15.75) 
2.973*** 
(15.19) 
2.758*** 
(11.05) 
2.709*** 
(14.20) 
-11.101* 
(-1.79) 
-15.172** 
(-2.38) 
1.533*** 
(5.44) 
0.829*** 
(3.80) 
GEQ -0.116*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.037 
(-0.98) 
-0.043 
(-0.79) 
-0.027 
(-0.68) 
1.160*** 
(5.29) 
1.192*** 
(5.50) 
0.333*** 
(5.64) 
0.386*** 
(8.35) 
AFR*GEQ 0.114* 
(1.68) 
   -0.261*** 
(-3.67) 
   
LOW*GEQ  0.159* 
(1.94) 
   0.065 
(0.73) 
  
IDA*GEQ   0.094 
(1.39) 
   0.034 
(0.46) 
 
BLEND*GEQ    0.176** 
(2.19) 
   -0.006 
(-0.07) 
AFR -0.779*** 
(-3.30) 
   0.242 
(0.99) 
   
LOW  -0.795*** 
(-2.89) 
   -0.701** 
(-2.33) 
  
IDA   -0.312 
(-1.28) 
   -0.527* 
(-1.95) 
 
BLEND    -0.573** 
(-2.01) 
   0.369 
(1.12) 
REG -0.049 
(-1.11) 
-0.040 
(-0.88) 
0.008 
(0.17) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
0.145*** 
(3.14) 
0.140*** 
(2.82) 
0.197*** 
(3.91) 
0.174*** 
(3.33) 
FREG 0.012 
(0.25) 
-0.020 
(-0.41) 
-0.013 
(-0.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
0.386*** 
(7.62) 
0.338*** 
(6.22) 
0.254*** 
(4.35) 
0.352*** 
(6.17) 
MAM 0.061* 
(1.66) 
0.067* 
(1.76) 
0.068* 
(1.77) 
0.075* 
(1.94) 
-0.098** 
(-2.55) 
-0.081* 
(-1.98) 
-0.096** 
(-2.28) 
-0.111** 
(-2.53) 
EFF -0.007*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.009*** 
(-7.85) 
-0.009*** 
(-8.36) 
-0.002** 
(-2.06) 
-0.003** 
(-2.55) 
-0.005*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.21) 
ΔGDP -0.005 
(-1.07) 
-0.010** 
(-2.08) 
-0.011** 
(-2.24) 
-0.009* 
(-1.94) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.62) 
Year fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 17.03 12.36 7.57 7.99 53.53 46.88 43.71 41.32 
F-stat 8.56 6.19 4.02 4.20 41.44 31.98 28.26 25.72 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 701 701 701 701 668 668 668 668 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. Explanatory variables: ESR = Panel 
regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Explanatory variables: GEQ = gender equality advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM = macroeconomic 
management quality variable; EFF = banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: RISK = natural 
logarithm of z-score, reflecting banking insolvency risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) stability; PF = 
domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) representing sector-wide financial system stability which is achieved through sufficient credit 
supply to the private sector within the financial system, higher is better. AFR = binary variable that equals one if the country is an African 
country and zero otherwise. LOW = binary variable that equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero otherwise. IDA = binary 
variable that equals one if the country is an IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND = binary variable that equals one if the country is a 
BLEND country and zero otherwise. 
 
5.3.3.3. Social Protection advocacy 
In Panel A of Table 7, AFR*SP and BLEND*SP coefficients are positively significant in column 1&4 
and indicate that the association between social protection advocacy and financial stability is 
positively significant for African countries and for BLEND countries. This implies that greater 
advocacy for social protection can improve bank-led financial stability for African countries and for 
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BLEND countries. However, in Panel B of Table 7, only BLEND coefficient is positively significant 
indicating that greater social protection advocacy has positive effects for sector-wide financial system 
stability among BLEND countries. 
Table 7. Effect of Social Protection advocacy on Financial Stability (country group analyses) 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 3.570*** 
(14.92) 
2.806*** 
(12.77) 
1.843*** 
(6.92) 
3.094*** 
(15.67) 
1.886*** 
(7.25) 
1.540*** 
(6.12) 
1.796*** 
(5.00) 
1.674*** 
(7.05) 
SP -0.134** 
(-1.99) 
0.067 
(1.06) 
0.342*** 
(4.03) 
-0.031 
(-0.54) 
-0.119 
(-1.62) 
-0.035 
(-0.48) 
-0.015 
(-0.13) 
-0.111 
(-1.61) 
AFR*SP 0.328*** 
(4.01) 
   -0.100 
(-1.11) 
   
LOW*SP  0.015 
(0.18) 
   -0.109 
(-1.09) 
  
IDA*SP   -0.359*** 
(-3.94) 
   -0.143 
(-1.22) 
 
BLEND*SP    0.724*** 
(7.01) 
   0.691*** 
(4.22) 
AFR -1.399** 
(-5.32) 
   -0.407 
(-1.41) 
   
LOW  -0.303 
(-1.15) 
   -0.177 
(-0.56) 
  
IDA   1.195*** 
(3.98) 
   0.051 
(0.13) 
 
BLEND    -2.264*** 
(-6.76) 
   -1.969*** 
(-3.64) 
REG -0.082* 
(-1.70) 
-0.068 
(-1.36) 
-0.051 
(-1.01) 
-0.051 
(-1.04) 
0.302*** 
(5.77) 
0.330*** 
(5.77) 
0.404*** 
(6.86) 
0.359*** 
(5.98) 
FREG -0.006 
(-0.12) 
-0.029 
(-0.59) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
-0.015 
(-0.29) 
0.431*** 
(8.13) 
0.379*** 
(6.56) 
0.315*** 
(5.15) 
0.405*** 
(6.68) 
MAM 0.019 
(0.51) 
0.052 
(1.36) 
0.021 
(0.53) 
0.023 
(0.61) 
-0.047 
(-1.18) 
-0.019 
(-0.45) 
-0.051 
(-1.13) 
-0.051 
(-1.13) 
EFF -0.007*** 
(-6.14) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.03) 
-0.009*** 
(-8.27) 
-0.009*** 
(-8.64) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.02) 
ΔGDP -0.009* 
(-1.79) 
-0.011** 
(-2.31) 
-0.008 
(-1.62) 
-0.007 
(-1.52) 
-0.013** 
(-2.35) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.35) 
Year fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 18.08 12.09 9.90 14.15 51.19 41.99 38.11 36.39 
F-stat 9.08 6.04 5.03 7.04 37.61 26.26 22.48 20.96 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 697 697 697 697 664 664 664 664 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. Explanatory variables: SP = social 
protection advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM = macroeconomic management variable; EFF = banking 
sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: RISK = Banking insolvency risk with higher values indicating 
greater financial (and banking) stability; PF = domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) representing credit supply to the financial 
system, higher is better AFR = binary variable that equals one if the country is an African country and zero otherwise. LOW = binary 
variable that equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero otherwise. IDA = binary variable that equals one if the country is an 
IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND = binary variable that equals one if the country is a country is a BLEND country and zero 
otherwise. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
5.3.3.4. Social activism cluster 
Next, we re-introduce the social activism cluster variable and re-run the estimations for each country-
group. In Panel A of Table 8, AFR*GD and BLEND*GD coefficients are positively significant in 
column 1&4, indicating that social activism has positive effects for bank-led financial stability in 
African countries and BLEND countries. On the other hand, IDA*GD coefficient is negatively 
significant in column 3, implying that social activism has negative effects for bank-led financial 
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stability in IDA countries. In Panel B, AFR*GD and IDA*GD coefficients are negatively significant 
in column 5&7, indicating that social activism has negative effects for sector-wide financial system 
stability in African countries and IDA countries. 
Table 8: Effect of Social Activism (cluster) on Financial Stability (country group analyses) 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 3.694*** 
(14.13) 
3.044*** 
(13.32) 
1.843*** 
(6.92) 
3.056*** 
(14.25) 
0.599** 
(2.18) 
0.824*** 
(3.26) 
0.847** 
(2.39) 
0.756*** 
(3.05) 
GD -0.233*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.026 
(-0.39) 
0.342*** 
(4.03) 
-0.117* 
(-1.67) 
0.508*** 
(6.40) 
0.504*** 
(6.79) 
0.601*** 
(5.85) 
0.477*** 
(5.81) 
AFR*GD 0.305*** 
(3.25) 
   -0.437*** 
(-4.45) 
   
LOW*GD  0.166 
(1.63) 
   -0.081 
(-0.72) 
  
IDA*GD   -0.359*** 
(-3.94) 
   -0.190* 
(-1.64) 
 
BLEND*GD    0.528*** 
(4.79) 
   0.189 
(1.36) 
AFR -1.376*** 
(-4.43) 
   0.757** 
(2.34) 
   
LOW  -0.793** 
(-2.41) 
   -0.249 
(-0.68) 
  
IDA   1.195*** 
(3.98) 
   0.240 
(0.61) 
 
BLEND    -1.691*** 
(-4.59) 
   -0.299 
(-0.64) 
REG -0.046 
(-0.95) 
-0.049 
(-0.99) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.124** 
(2.42) 
0.105* 
(1.87) 
0.163*** 
(2.86) 
0.146** 
(2.48) 
FREG 0.013 
(0.27) 
-0.021 
(-0.43) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.362*** 
(7.02) 
0.299*** 
(5.37) 
0.238*** 
(3.97) 
0.314*** 
(5.32) 
MAM 0.038 
(1.02) 
0.048 
(1.24) 
0.046 
(1.16) 
0.065* 
(1.67) 
-0.068* 
(-1.74) 
-0.060 
(-1.41) 
-0.088*** 
(-2.03) 
-0.089* 
(-1.96) 
EFF -0.007*** 
(-6.79) 
-0.007*** 
(-7.11) 
-0.009*** 
(-8.19) 
-0.010*** 
(-8.97) 
-0.002* 
(-1.69) 
-0.003** 
(-2.30) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.26) 
ΔGDP -0.006 
(-1.32) 
-0.012** 
(-2.37) 
-0.009* 
(-1.91) 
-0.007 
(-1.52) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.67) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.82) 
Year fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 17.66 12.21 7.84 10.65 53.56 45.84 41.83 39.35 
F-statistic 8.85 6.09 4.12 5.37 41.24 30.53 26.09 23.64 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 697 697 697 697 664 664 664 664 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. Explanatory variables: GD = is the 
aggregate cluster for the social activism aggregate variables. FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM = macroeconomic 
management variable; EFF = banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: RISK = Banking insolvency 
risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) stability; PF = domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) representing 
credit supply to the financial system, higher is better AFR = binary variable that equals one if the country is an African country and zero 
otherwise. LOW = binary variable that equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero otherwise. IDA = binary variable that 
equals one if the country is an IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND = binary variable that equals one if the country is a country is a 
BLEND country and zero otherwise. GD = is the aggregate cluster for the social activism aggregate variables. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
5.3.3.5. Financial Crisis and Social Activism Cluster: Interaction Analysis 
Finally, we test whether the association between social activism and financial stability in each region 
for the post-financial crisis period. The results in Table 9 show that the interaction terms are 
insignificant and suggest that the association between social activism and financial stability is not 
significant in the post-financial crisis period for the four country-groups.  
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Table 9. Effect of Social Activism (Cluster) on Stability during post-crisis period (country group analyses) 
 (A) 
Stability measure: z-score (RISK) 
(B) 
Stability measure: Private credit to GDP ratio (PF) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 3.149*** 
(14.91) 
2.806*** 
(13.88) 
2.557*** 
(11.11) 
2.466*** 
(12.48) 
1.060*** 
(4.61) 
0.635*** 
(2.78) 
0.944*** 
(3.53) 
0.252 
(1.09) 
GD -0.085 
(-1.36) 
0.026 
(0.42) 
0.040 
(0.63) 
0.058 
(0.91) 
0.346*** 
(5.13) 
0.520*** 
(7.39) 
0.519*** 
(7.03) 
0.569*** 
(7.59) 
AFR*FN*GD 0.043 
(1.63) 
   -0.003 
(-0.11) 
   
LOW*FN*GD  0.037 
(1.32) 
   0.026 
(0.85) 
  
IDA*FN*GD   0.0378 
(1.32) 
   0.019 
(0.59) 
 
BLEND*FN*GD    -0.035 
(-1.04) 
   -0.025 
(-0.63) 
AFR -0.467*** 
(-6.71) 
   -0.673*** 
(-9.21) 
   
LOW  -0.339*** 
(-4.71) 
   -0.571*** 
(-7.27) 
  
IDA   -0.054 
(-0.69) 
   -0.437*** 
(-4.95) 
 
BLEND    0.121 
(1.36) 
   0.387*** 
(3.65) 
FN -0.028 
(-0.46) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
-0.039 
(-0.51) 
0.065 
(1.31) 
0.297*** 
(4.55) 
0.248*** 
(4.11) 
0.247*** 
(2.77) 
-0.025 
(-0.63) 
REG -0.043 
(-0.91) 
-0.048 
(-0.96) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
-0.009 
(-0.18) 
0.109** 
(2.08) 
0.094* 
(1.68) 
0.159*** 
(2.76) 
0.140** 
(2.36) 
FREG 0.007 
(0.15) 
-0.026 
(-0.53) 
-0.015 
(-0.28) 
-0.021 
(-0.42) 
0.346*** 
(6.56) 
0.287*** 
(5.13) 
0.213*** 
(3.55) 
0.297*** 
(5.01) 
MAM 0.042 
(1.14) 
0.0512 
(1.34) 
0.048 
(1.23) 
0.049 
(1.25) 
-0.094** 
(-2.36) 
-0.080* 
(-1.89 
-0.101** 
(-2.30) 
-0.114** 
(-2.53) 
EFF -0.006*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.007 
(-6.97) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.63) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.66) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
-0.003** 
(-2.30) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.62) 
ΔGDP -0.006 
(-1.25) 
-0.011** 
(-2.23) 
-0.011** 
(-2.21) 
-0.010** 
(-2.10) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.48) 
fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 16.97 12.35 7.93 7.90 51.12 44.72 40.16 37.91 
F-statistic 16.80 11.89 7.66 7.64 78 60.58 50.43 45.97 
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 697 697 697 697 664 664 664 664 
Panel regression with fixed effects is applied. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Explanatory variables: ESR = environmental sustainability advocacy variable; FREQ = financial sector quality variable; MAM 
= macroeconomic management quality variable; EFF = banking sector efficiency; ΔGDP = state of the economy. Dependent variables: 
RISK = natural logarithm of z-score, reflecting banking insolvency risk with higher values indicating greater financial (and banking) 
stability; PF = domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) representing sector-wide financial system stability which is achieved through 
sufficient credit supply to the private sector within the financial system, higher is better. AFR = binary variable that equals one if the 
country is an African country and zero otherwise. LOW = binary variable that equals one if the country is a low-income country and zero 
otherwise. IDA = binary variable that equals one if the country is an IDA country and zero otherwise. BLEND = binary variable that equals 
one if the country is a BLEND country and zero otherwise. FN = is a binary variable that equals one if the post-financial crisis period 
(2009-2016), and zero for the pre-crisis period (2005 to 2016). 
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Table 10: Summary of country-group coefficients significance (*) 
   Insolvency risk Private credit 
Variables RISK PF AFR LOW IDA BLEND AFR LOW IDA BLEND 
ESR (-) (+)* (+)* (+)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-) (-)* (+) 
GEQ (+)* (-) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)* (-)* (+) (+) (-) 
SP (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)* (+)* (-) (-) (-) (+)* 
GD (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)* (+)* (+)* (-) (-) (-)* 
ESR*FN (-) (-)*         
GEQ*FN (-) (+)         
SP*FN (-) (-)*         
GD*FN (-) (-)         
Gender equality advocacy has positive effects for financial stability only for low-income countries and for 
IDA countries but not for African countries and BLEND countries. Social protection advocacy has positive 
effects for financial stability in BLEND countries. (+) denotes the result is positively significant, (-) denotes 
the coefficient is negatively significant. * denotes the coefficient is significant 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of social activism on financial stability. Social activism was 
analysed from three perspectives: gender equality advocacy, environmental sustainability advocacy 
and social protection advocacy. The findings reveal that gender equality and environmental 
sustainability advocacy have significant positive effects for financial stability while social protection 
advocacy has a significant negative effect for financial stability. Social activism has negative effects 
for financial stability in the post-crisis era. Finally, there are differential effects for country-groups, 
social activism strongly improves bank-led financial stability in African countries and for Blend 
countries. 
The implication of the findings for policy-making is that the pressure on, or commitment of, financial 
institutions to be socially inclusive in all social matters such as gender equality, environmental 
sustainability, social protection, etc., does not guarantee a sustained bank-led financial stability or 
sector-wide financial stability; therefore, regulators should ensure that financial institutions exercise 
careful discretion when adjusting their risk models to include ‘social risk’ factors amidst the recent 
pressure on corporations to be socially inclusive. Another implication for business practice is that 
business leaders in financial institutions should identify the optimal level of social inclusivity that 
improves the stability of their corporations, because it would seem counterproductive if business 
leaders adopt full-scale social inclusion (or considerations) that subsequently make their corporations 
financially unstable which could lead to loss of shareholders’ wealth.  
Finally, one direction for future research is the need to explore other channels through which activism 
can influence financial system. While our analyses posit that the main channel through activism 
affects stability in the financial system is through the presence of quality advocacy institutions, there 
is also the potential for other channels to influence financial stability, channels such as the frequency 
of riots, number of riots, verbal censoring, etc. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Variable Description 
Symbo
l 
Variable Description Source 
ESR CPIA policy 
and 
institutions 
for 
environment
al 
sustainability 
rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
Policy and institutions for 
environmental sustainability 
assess the extent to which 
environmental policies 
foster the protection and 
sustainable use of natural 
resources and the 
management of pollution. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
 
SP CPIA social 
protection 
rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
 
Social protection and labor 
assess government policies 
in social protection and 
labor market regulations 
that reduce the risk of 
becoming poor, assist those 
who are poor to better 
manage further risks, and 
ensure a minimal level of 
welfare to all people. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
 
GEQ CPIA gender 
equality 
rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
 
Gender equality assesses 
the extent to which the 
country has installed 
institutions and programs to 
enforce laws and policies 
that promote equal access 
for men and women in 
education, health, the 
economy, and protection 
under law. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
 
REG CPIA 
business 
regulatory 
environment 
rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
 
Business regulatory 
environment assesses the 
extent to which the legal, 
regulatory, and policy 
environments help or hinder 
private businesses in 
investing, creating jobs, and 
becoming more productive. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
 
FREG CPIA 
financial 
sector rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
Financial sector assesses the 
structure of the financial 
sector and the policies and 
regulations that affect it. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
MAM CPIA 
macroecono
mic 
management 
rating 
(1=low to 
6=high) 
Macroeconomic 
management assesses the 
monetary, exchange rate, 
and aggregate demand 
policy framework. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
 
EFF Bank cost to 
income ratio 
(%) 
Raw data are from 
Bankscope.  Data2090 / 
(data2080 + data2085). All 
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
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 Numerator and denominator 
are first aggregated on the 
country level before 
division. Note that banks 
used in the calculation 
might differ between 
indicators. Calculated from 
underlying bank-by-bank 
unconsolidated data from 
Bankscope. 
PF Domestic 
credit to 
private sector 
(% of GDP) 
 
Domestic credit to private 
sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the 
private sector, such as 
through loans, purchases of 
nonequity securities, and 
trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that 
establish a claim for 
repayment. For some 
countries these claims 
include credit to public 
enterprises. 
World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
 
ΔGDP GDP growth 
(annual %) 
 
Annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 
U.S. dollars. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without 
making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural 
resources. 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
 
RISK Bank Z-score 
 
It captures the probability 
of default of a country's 
banking system. Z-score 
compares the buffer of a 
country's banking system 
(capitalization and returns) 
with the volatility of those 
returns. It is estimated as 
(ROA+(equity/assets))/sd(R
OA); sd(ROA) is the 
standard deviation of ROA. 
ROA, equity, and assets are 
country-level aggregate 
figures Calculated from 
underlying bank-by-bank 
unconsolidated data from 
Bankscope. 
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
 
BLEN
D 
BLEND 
countries 
BLEND countries are 
countries that are eligible 
http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries 
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for IDA borrowing based 
on per capita income levels 
and are also creditworthy 
for some borrowing from 
the IBRD. They are referred 
to as “blend” countries. 
 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articl
es/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups 
 
LOW Low-income 
countries 
These are countries that 
have a per capita income 
level of $1,005 or less.     
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articl
es/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups 
 
IDA IDA 
countries 
These are the countries that 
are eligible for borrowing 
from the International 
Development Association 
(IDA) 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articl
es/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups 
 
AFR African 
countries 
African countries in our 
sample. 
 
    
 
 
A2: Country Grouping 
 Group  # 
African Countries  Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo DR, Congo Rep, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
39 
BLEND countries Moldova, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Cameroon, Mongolia, 
Congo Rep, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Dominica, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, 
Grenada, Papua New Guinea, Kenya, St Lucia 
14 
IDA countries Afghanistan, Haiti, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Honduras, Samoa, 
Benin, São Tomé and Principe, Bhutan, Kosovo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Lao PDR, Solomon Islands, 
Cambodia, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Liberia, South 
Sudan, Chad, Madagascar, Sudan, Comoros, Malawi, Congo DR, 
Maldives, Tajikistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Tanzania, Djibouti, Togo, 
Eritrea, Mauritania, Tonga, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Ghana, Vanuatu, Guinea, Nepal, Yemen Republic, Guinea-
Bissau, Nicaragua, Zambia, Guyana, Niger 
52 
Low-income 
countries 
Afghanistan, Guinea, Rwanda, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Liberia, South Sudan, Chad, Madagascar, Tanzania, Comoros, Malawi, 
Togo, Congo DR, Mali, Uganda, Eritrea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia, Nepal, The Gambia and Niger 
29 
Note: This grouping is obtained from the World Bank (see A1 for data source). Per the World Bank, some 
countries fall under multiple country groups. African countries are countries in the African continent. 
BLEND countries are countries that are eligible for IDA borrowing based on per capita income levels and are 
also creditworthy for some borrowing from the International Bank of Restructuring and Development 
(IBRD). They are referred to as “blend” countries. Low-income countries are countries that have a per capita 
income level of $1,005 or less. IDA countries are countries that are eligible for borrowing from the 
International Development Association (IDA) 
 
